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Abstract 
Over recent decades critical scholars have quite rightly warned of the control 
implications of new management initiatives. There is a danger, however, of treating 
control in a ‘distal’ way or as an ‘end’. Through drawing on proximal (Cooper and Law, 
1995) theorising, we make explicit what is often implicit in such accounts, which is that 
control is best understood as unfinished, in process, for it is inherently contingent 
and unpredictable. Viewed in this way, control becomes elusive as it always has 
to be achieved. The article draws on ethnographic research conducted in a back 
office of a manufacturing organisation to illustrate this understanding of 
management control. It highlights tensions between staff and management and 
between multiple layers of management that can thwart control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of our elaborate plans, the end 
Of everything that stands, the end 
No safety or surprise, the end….. 
Can you picture what will be? (The End; The Doors) 
There is a longstanding interest in organisational control (e.g. Braverman, 1974; 
Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979; Friedman, 1977). It has been suggested by some that 
the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic control is being tightened through new management 
2 
initiatives (e.g. Barker,1993; Delbridge et al,1992; Korczynski, 2001; Ray,1986; 
Sewell,1998; Sewell and Wilkinson,1992; Visser et al, 2018; Willmott,1993). Scholars 
have focused on attempts to control employees values (Hawkins, 2008), emotions (e.g. 
Hochschild, 1983) and meanings (e.g. Kärreman and Rylander, 2008) through 
normative (e.g. Kunda, 1992; Müller, 2017; Wilson, 1999), neo-normative (Fleming 
and Sturdy, 2011; Jenkins and Delbridge, 2017) or concertive (Barker, 1993; Hawkins, 
2013) means which often combine hierarchical and peer-based control (Clegg and 
Courpasson, 2004; Sewell,1998). 
This literature has shed considerable light on different modalities of control. We 
seek to add to it by adopting a ‘proximal’ approach which refers to ‘The continuous and 
unfinished; it’s what is forever approached but never attained, …always partial and 
precarious’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 239). This approach attends to the ‘processes’ 
rather than the ‘effects’ of control. By contrast, a ‘distal’ understanding of control 
focuses on outcomes or ‘ends’. It: 
Privileges results and outcomes, the “finished” things or objects of thought and 
action….the distal is what is preconceived, what appears already constituted and 
known…stresses boundaries and separation, distinctiveness and clarity, 
hierarchy and order (Cooper and Law,1995:239) 
Even critical scholars can slip into distal thinking when culture is considered to be ‘The 
last frontier of control’ (Ray,1986); space ‘The final frontier’ (Baldry,1999) and Total 
Quality Management (TQM) as pushing ‘back the frontier of control’ (Delbridge et 
al,1992). We must avoid assuming or implying that control, like a frontier, can be 
crossed or achieved. Delbridge et al (1992) acknowledged that conflict and resistance 
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will remain and this is consistent with Goodrich’s (1920) understanding of the ‘frontier 
of control’. Nevertheless, control is often represented in a distal way as inexorably 
straightjacketing employees who ‘are forced toward surviving rather than resisting their 
exploitation’ (Delbridge,1995:814). By contrast, we see workplace struggle as ‘a fluid 
and imprecise borderline’ (Hughes and Dobbins,2020:1) that is ‘always contestable and 
often contested’ (Ackroyd and Thompson,1999:89).  
This article seeks to make the contested processes of control explicit by 
recognising that control has to be made to work because ‘organizations do not simply 
“persist”….they have to be continually produced - that is, reproduced’ 
(Burawoy,1979:6). Proximal theorising is incompatible with the notion of a frontier of 
control beyond which employees’ freedom, autonomy or uncertainty is lost because 
organisations are understood to be continually in a process of becoming (Tsoukas and 
Chia, 2002). Control then cannot be equated with intentions, potential or the design of 
control systems (e.g. Sihag and Rajsdijk, 2019) for it is an ever-unfolding process.  
We thus challenge, both theoretically and empirically, that control can be 
attained or, alternatively, that ‘we may be approaching’ (Raelin,2011:150) a post-
bureaucratic era that heralds the ‘end of managerial control’ (op cit:136; emphasis 
added) as both reflect distal thinking. Drawing on proximal theory, we would caution 
against assuming that operating ‘without a hierarchy’ means that ‘control has been 
replaced by social relationships, shared responsibility’ (op cit:144) because shared 
responsibility simply constitutes a different form of control. In view of this, we believe 
that ‘control will persist’ (op cit:150) under capitalism due to the economic necessity 
of paid employment and the indeterminacy of labour power. We agree with Raelin 
(2011) that control takes different forms and is ‘widely distributed’ (op cit:146) but this 
is not necessarily due to management intentions or  design but because, as Cressey and 
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MacInnes (1980) put it, ‘workers themselves actually control the detail of the 
performance of their tasks’ (op cit:14).   
There is a voluminous literature on resistance that questions a ‘totalising’ 
understanding of control for even in seemingly ‘cleansed cultures’ (Strangleman and 
Roberts, 1999) resistance remains (e.g. Hawkins, 2008). However, pointing towards 
resistance is insufficient to avoid ‘distal’ thinking because metaphorically, control may 
still be seen as the granite against which resistance chips. Through focusing on the 
processes of control, we can avoid ‘distal’ conceptualisations and perceive control as 
far more fluid, porous and fragile.  
In the 1980’s and 1990’s numerous organisations began to adapt the principles 
of TQM in developing their own quality systems (Weckenmann et al, 2015). One of the 
most widely known is Six Sigma (e.g. Linderman, et al, 2003) developed by Motorola. 
A less known system is Manufacturing Excellent Standards or MES (pseudonym) - an 
initiative developed and practised by the parent organization (PO) of our case study 
company. It reflects a broader based approach than Six Sigma. It is less data oriented 
and revolves around three principles: (1). Process improvement and waste elimination, 
(2). Decision-making, and (3). Problem solving. It therefore combines normative and 
rational discourses (Barley and Kunda, 1992) or, more precisely, lean manufacturing 
techniques (Womack et al, 1990), quality improvement philosophies (e.g. Deming, 
1986) and teamwork (Barker, 1993).  
We explore the control dynamics of MES through an ethnographic study of a 
manufacturing organization called Boltsco (pseudonym). Senior management 
displayed distal assumptions in relation to MES which was presented as enabling the 
organisation to ‘achieve a level of quality and productivity improvement that will 
delight our customers’ (corporate website).  Likewise, some critical scholars display 
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distal thinking when they argue that quality systems create ‘an enhanced, more 
insidious form of … control’ (Wilson, 1999: 672). Delbridge (1995), who in his 
ethnographic study of TQM/JIT, considered the ‘process of management control’ 
(Delbridge,1995:803) argued that such a system allows ‘management to avoid the 
dysfunctions of bureaucratic control’ (op cit:809). By contrast, we illuminate the 
complex and unpredictable ways in which MES unravelled, its dysfunctions and 
unintended consequences. We do so through focusing on multiple struggles among 
employees, between employees versus managers and managers versus managers. The 
central question we explore is: how can our understanding of control be enhanced by 
adopting a proximal approach that views control as a process not an end? The next 
section engages with relevant literature on control. The ethnographic research 
methodology will then be outlined before we present the empirical findings. Finally, 
the key insights of the article are drawn out in a discussion and conclusion. 
 
CONTROL AT WORK 
There is a wealth of critical literature that focuses on control but, at times, it is 
presented in distal terms (Cooper and Law, 1995). What we mean by this is that 
statements are made regarding control that present it as achievable or an already 
achieved end that exploits, dominates or subjugates employees through deskilling 
(Braverman, 1974), panoptic (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992, Veen et al, 2020), branding 
(Müller, 2017), concertive (Barker, 1993; Hawkins, 2013), cultural (Ezzy, 2001; 
Ray,1985), neo-normative (Fleming and Sturdy, 2011; Jenkins and Delbridge, 2017) or 
spacial (Baldry,1999) means. Hence Casey (1995) referred to a ‘new culture program’ 
where managers ‘deliberately designed’ a culture that is capable of ‘shaping the way 
things are done….and the character of its employees’ (op cit: 93). Similarly, Ezzy 
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(2001) referred to the ‘colonization of the self’ that occurs through ‘normative control’ 
that ‘results in the virtual absence of displays of resistance’ (op cit: 636). 
In relation to TQM, Tuckman (1994) argued that it removes individual autonomy 
and enables management determination by reshaping workers’ initiative. In a similar 
vein, Steingard and Fitzgibbons (1993) depicted TQM as a ‘totalizing narrative that, by 
implication, subordinates and silences any “Other” voices’ (op cit:28). Although we are 
sympathetic to the concerns of these critics and believe that their warning needed to be 
sounded, it also needs to be said that control rarely works so seamlessly (see Knights 
and McCabe,1998).  
Approaching control from a distal perspective tends to conflate design with 
outcomes. For example, Boje and Winsor (1993) posited that by convincing workers 
that power stems from their own actions, TQM programmes have ‘succeeded in 
eliminating the resistance that has long characterised management/labour relations’ (op 
cit:66). The possibilities of a given technology are extrapolated whereby control 
implications are presented as being, or potentially being, realised. It could be argued 
that these critiques are polemics intended to counter the swathe of managerialism that 
saturates our lives. Yet proximal theorising can also destabilise established narratives 
through illuminating that organisational life is precarious. 
More recent literature has pointed towards the hybridization (Courpasson and Dany, 
2009; Veen et al, 2020) of different forms of control. Critics have argued that post-
bureaucratic discourses and the associated ‘flexibility offensive’ (Cooke, 2006: 224) 
mask the tightening grip of the bureaucratic iron cage (Barker, 1993; Clegg and 
Courpasson, 2004; Korczynski, 2001; Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992; Willmott, 1993).  
New cultural forms of control (e.g. Müller, 2017) are understood to supplement 
traditional bureaucratic methods (Korczynski, 2001) and yet we know surprisingly little 
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about ‘the interfaces and interactions’ (Thompson and Van den Broek, 2010: 9) 
between different modalities of control.  More work is needed on how they evolve and 
‘the role over time of organizational actors in gradually shaping and defining 
mechanisms’ of control (McLoughlin et al, 2005: 71; original emphasis). Although 
tensions between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic discourses have been explored 
(e.g. Hodgson and Briand, 2013), the associated control mechanisms are often assumed 
or are depicted as blending ‘seamlessly together’ (Hodgson, 2004: 98), which fits with 
distal theorising.  
Sewell’s (1998) analysis of the ‘integrative role of chimerical control’ (Sewell, 
1998: 421) is a case in point. While he offers a compelling analysis of the processes of 
control, according to his analysis domination is ‘supported and amplified’ by the 
combination of surveillance and peer group scrutiny. Others, for example, Callaghan 
and Thompson (2001:23) in their study of a call centre also illustrate how control is 
‘strengthened and deepened’ by the application of structural control. While indicating 
that there is scope for individual and collective agency, the authors explore how 
structural control utilises the complimentary effects of bureaucratic and technological 
controls which ‘blend together’ (p. 13) and shape not only the organisational but also 
the social structures of the workplace. In a similar vein, Orlikowski’s analysis (1991:29) 
illustrates how the introduction of ‘electronic mediation’ can lead to the ‘augmentation 
of personal, social structural, and cultural control’ and Veen et al (2020: 395) describe 
how technical, bureaucratic, normative and algorithmic control act in ‘tightly 
interwoven, complementary and reinforcing ways’ in the gig economy sector.     
Our ethnographic study adds to these insights by examining how control plays 
out in ways that generate unintended consequences reflecting a proximal perspective.  
Through exploring the inherent uncertainty of social relations, which does not cease 
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when control becomes legion or when management seeks to remedy errors of design or 
implementation, our concern is to illuminate how managerial control is never an end 
since the web of control is apt to be perennially flawed. Nor will the need for managerial 
control end whilst people are forced by economic necessity to work. In distal terms, 
control, spider-like, scurries along a web attracted by tiny vibrations, but in proximal 
terms, the web is often pierced, torn, frayed or unfinished. Nevertheless, control should 
not be thought of as ‘a single, collective super-organism’ but rather like an ant colony 
where every ant ‘is part of the action and carries it forward’ or back (Ingold,2008:210). 
Earlier ethnographic studies have focused on cultural forms of control 
(Barker,1993; Casey,1995; Kunda,1995; Hawkins,2008; 2013) whereas we consider 
rational/bureaucratic and normative controls (see also McCabe,2014). To add to 
ethnographies focusing on relations between management and labour (Beynon,1975; 
Burawoy,1979; Collinson,1992; Delbridge,1995; Roy,1955), we also consider 
struggles between multiple layers of management. We therefore elucidate additional 
complexities that hinder control. Although ethnographic studies have explored 
‘management’ (Watson,1994a), the focus was not on control per se but on 
understanding how managers ‘make sense of their work….while striving to shape both 
their lives and the work efforts of others’ (Watson,1994b:894) or the experiences and 
practice of managerial work (Kornberger et al, 2011). 
 
ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH METHODS 
This article is based on a nine-month long at-home ethnography (Alvesson, 2009). We 
understand ethnography as a particular ‘way of seeing’ (Wolcott, 1999) which entails 
prolonged immersion in the studied community. It is ideally suited to a proximal 
analysis that attends to organisational details, relations and processes (Cooper and Law, 
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1995:249). The third author collected the data whilst working at Boltsco and studying 
for an academic degree under the supervision of the second author. As an insider 
ethnographer, she had already worked at Boltsco for two years, initially as a logistics 
clerk, and subsequently in sales, prior to data collection and so was familiar with the 
challenges facing MES implementation. The purpose of the study was to gain an in-
depth understanding of how organisational actors related to and implemented MES in 
their daily activities. Due to the open access as well as the scope and timelines of MES 
implementation at Boltsco, the site was ideally suited for our research question. As the 
fieldwork commenced, the third author was promoted and became a middle manager in 
marketing. This provided a unique vantage point shifting from an employee on the 
receiving end of MES to a more engaged management role. This change, however, also 
posed additional demands as MES changed from ‘something new to learn’ (research 
journal) to a managerial responsibility as the researcher was assigned to three different 
MES teams.  
 Research access was obtained through a promise of anonymity and the provision of 
a research report. Participant consent involved subtle daily negotiations, often 
undertaken while taking field notes. This process of negotiating consent was imbued 
with ethical issues due to the researcher’s entanglement in different relationships and 
multiple commitments. Participants were promised anonymity both in relation to other 
organisation members and in the report to senior management. The insider 
ethnographer status enabled up-close exploration of the unexpected twists and turns of 
MES but it also involved tensions in terms of  ‘walking the line’ (Gottwald, Sowa and 
Staples, 2018). In other words, striking a balance when trying to navigate multiple and 
competing demands and roles in relation to the professional and academic contexts. 
Ongoing researcher reflexivity, facilitated by discussions with the academic team, 
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helped to address these situational microethical issues (Guilemin and Gillam, 2004).  
Data Collection and Analysis 
The research included participant observation, ‘go-along’ interviews (Kusenbach, 
2003) and documentary analysis. The bulk of the data was generated through participant 
observation and involved daily field note taking - often seen as the hallmark of 
ethnographic studies (Van Maanen, 2015). Ethnography, as an approach and an analytic 
tool (Dewalt et al, 2010), enabled us to investigate how different organisation members 
worked with MES. One hundred weekly MES team meetings were observed, which 
translated into over 200 entries in a research journal. In addition, other management, 
project and update meetings were observed, which offered an opportunity to capture 
many impromptu conversations pertaining to MES.  
Impromptu conversations were recorded as short verbatim dialogue transcripts 
in the research journal. Rather than following a formal interview schedule during sit-
down interviews, daily informal discussions were conducted with a cross-section of, in 
total, 40 Boltsco employees. ‘Go-along’ interviews (Kusenbach, 2003) were highly 
suitable for our research question as they combine observation with questions 
embedded in the work situation.  Organisational documents, including the complete 
suite of MES resources from the corporate website, training materials, high profile case 
studies, internal presentations, progress reports, MES audit documents, staff briefings  
and relevant official communication provided further insights into MES – its objectives, 
rationale, tools and timelines. In total, 57 documents were gathered and catalogued 
following Miles and Huberman’s (1994) guidelines.  
 The analysis commenced in tandem with data collection through a daily process of 
reading field notes and documents and writing in-process descriptive and reflective 
memos. Initially, the analysis was concerned with understanding the stated intentions, 
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promises, expectations and content of MES and entailed qualitative content analysis of 
the collected documents (Altheide, 2004). This involved studying MES tools, the 
chronology of events and the official framing of MES. As familiarity with MES grew, 
attention shifted towards MES as a form of control.  We focused on the evolving formal 
and informal processes through which MES worked and was undermined. As the 
analysis progressed, unintended consequences were identified and, through pattern 
coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994), they were mapped against the content of MES. 
We traced how these unintended consequences corresponded with the (1) assumptions, 
(2) preconditions and (3) processes of MES (see Table One), which are explored below. 
Finally, we analysed how the unintended consequences were imbued with different 
forms of control and thus traced the interweaving of normative (e.g. teamwork, 
customer service, continuous improvement) and rational controls (bureaucratic, lean 
production, standardization, surveillance).  
 
The Case study  
Boltsco, which manufactures products for the construction sector, was founded in the 
early twentieth century. It employs approximately 100 people in the UK, the majority 
of whom are male and are based in its back office while a third work in assembly. These 
two groups of employees work in different sites, hundreds of kilometres away from 
each other. The research was conducted in the back office although the third author 
supported an engineering team, based in a different site with its MES work, for six 
months. In the early 2000s, Boltsco was acquired by a global, multi-billion dollar 
conglomerate headquartered in the USA – the PO. The PO operates in a range of 
industries and all of its units are expected to adopt MES. The PO promotes normative 
control through teamwork (Kunda, 1992; Casey, 1995) and the ‘cult[ure] of the 
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customer’ (du Gay and Salaman, 1992). It also employs rational control (Barley and 
Kunda,1992) by standardising operating systems across its subsidiaries through 
bureaucratic means.  
 MES is expected to meet customer demand and deliver world-class quality 
solutions and services, which is consistent with TQM discourses (Knights and 
McCabe,1998; Tuckman,1994). Through its relentless pursuit of efficiency and waste 
reduction, as in lean production (Womack et al, 1990), MES is understood in distal 
terms by the PO as a means to control and improve performance.  
During the early stages of its implementation, two of Boltco’s middle managers 
were chosen to act as its ‘champions’ and underwent a two-day training course in the 
MES philosophy. It soon became clear that staff and management were reluctant to 
engage with MES. To meet the PO’s requirements, the champions initially did much of 
the MES-related work themselves but pressure increased for them to secure more 
widespread involvement. Five task groups were therefore created to apply specific MES 
tools thus putting ‘normative’ (Barker,1993; Hawkins, 2013) control into motion 
through weekly team meetings. All of Boltco’s management were allocated to teams.  
The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 resulted in some job losses and a re-
allocation of MES responsibilities to new champions. In the following sub-sections, we 
unpack different facets of MES as a form of control. We interrogate how the (1) 
assumptions, (2) preconditions and (3) processes of MES generated and intertwined 
with unintended consequences (see Table I):  
 
[Insert Table 1 here]  
 
(1). Contesting the assumptions of MES 
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Echoing distal theorising and other improvement philosophies (e.g. Womack et al, 
1990; Deming, 1986), corporate documents represent MES as a means to achieve 
control over product and service quality through standardized tools. It is assumed that 
MES is a universally applicable philosophy and an all-encompassing operating system 
that can generate efficiencies. Rather than ‘overcoming certain dysfunctions of 
bureaucratic control’ (Delbridge,1995:814), the emphasis on standardisation and 
bureaucracy exacerbated them and undermined the core assumptions of MES. Hence 
MES tools were seen as opening up a ‘can of worms’ leading to unnecessary work, such 
as drawing process and communication charts, continuous problem analyses and formal 
meetings. This view echoes Roy’s (1955) finding that ‘new’ work rules can make ‘more 
paperwork’ (op cit:262), as captured in a conversation prior to a MES meeting of non-
managerial staff:  
 
Amy: “[MES]  can be quite complex for no reason at all, it could be simplified.” 
 
Lewis: “I think for a lot of people the amount of work they put into [MES] they don’t 
get it out, they don’t get that much out of [MES].” 
 
Instead of improving processes, MES was understood to impede everyday work 
generating frustration with the additional bureaucracy. The following quote captured in 
fieldnotes is indicative of the emerging frustration: 
 
David: “F***ing [MES]… takes away from actual work, how am I supposed to get 




This observation endorses Roy’s (1955) insight that employees resist ‘managerial 
‘logics of efficiency’ because application of those ‘logics’ produces something 
considerably less than ‘efficiency’ (op cit:265).  Resistance was not, however, simply 
about opposition because staff and middle managers circumvented MES ‘to ‘get work 
out’’ (ibid). The third author also prioritised her day-to-day duties over MES. Like other 
employees, she experienced the bureaucratic MES processes as frustrating because they 
created extra work, measures and controls which changed how tasks were perceived.  
The additional bureaucracy contributed to this negative assessment of MES as did 
its imposition without regard for the local context, which reflected its assumed 
universal applicability. Rather than tightening the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic and 
normative control (e.g. Barker, 1993; Clegg and Courpasson, 2004; Wilson, 1999), 
MES confronted continuous problems, as a senior manager admitted:  
 
“When [MES] was first introduced we didn’t fully understand the process and how 
it could benefit the organisation, it wasn’t fully backed by the Management Team 
and reflecting on that I may have to take some blame.” (Nigel) 
 
As Nigel’s comments suggest, Boltco and the PO’s management were ‘divided’ 
(Parker,1995:540; Watson,1994a), which hindered control. A core assumption of MES 
is universal applicability, which meant that the local context was neglected during its 
implementation. This inadvertently undermined control because the MES bureaucracy 
rubbed up against Boltco’s anti-bureaucratic cultural traditions. 
 
(2). Challenging the Preconditions of MES 
15 
 
As a control mechanism, MES has preconditions that include familiarity with its tools 
and idiosyncratic language, as well as universal involvement and engaged leadership. 
The PO’s official documents extolled the simplicity of the MES philosophy. The 
perception among Boltco employees and managers, however, was that MES 
contradicted its own preconditions as it was far from simple. Hence its complex 
vocabulary was outlined in a 25-page glossary which includes 198 key terms. The third 
author, who studied all MES-related documents and completed MES online training, 
experienced MES as being obscured by its own jargon.  
The abstruse MES terminology led to misunderstandings hence the teams that were 
allocated to work with MES tools were often the only ones that understood them and 
their language. This inhibited cooperation and understanding between teams, which 
undermined normative team control (Barker, 1993). Instead of facilitating 
communication and co-operation, the esoteric terminology was, at times, used for 
political ends, to resist or enable a particular line of argument. This hindered dialogue, 
led to confusion and subverted control. This unanticipated political dimension of MES 
was observed during the weekly team meetings that were held to update the Senior 
Management Team on the progress of MES implementation. In one meeting, for 
example, a team leader, Mark, aggressively critiqued and undermined his colleagues. 
He used the MES terminology to expound his belief that what others deemed to be 
‘Satisfactory Results’ were actually unsatisfactory:  
  
Mark:  “It’s simply not good enough to get a result, you have to peel back the layers 
like an onion, you need to perform an RRCA (relentless root cause analysis)” 
 




Trish: “… [frustrated] The result is the result, I think you are trying to make 
something out of nothing in order to tick a box......I’ve just congratulated the team 
on a job well done and all you want to do is tell me how crap we are and how much 
more we could have done. I’m really pissed off now. What a downer! So now I have 
to go back and tell everyone I was wrong? They’ll really love that!” (Middle 
Manager) 
 
As the exchange illustrates, MES requires results to be bureaucratically documented 
through a particular process (i.e. the RRCA). This bureaucratic control necessitates a 
normative shift whereby everyone imbibes a particular bureaucratic way of talking, 
thinking and acting. This would support a shared understanding of the corporate 
philosophy and its unique language - a precondition of MES. The use of MES jargon, 
however, generated antagonism and obstructed understanding. In unintended ways, the 
MES language undermined another MES precondition - its requirement for universal 
involvement - because the obscure terminology precluded participation. As Trish’s 
remarks indicate, the emphasis on bureaucratic control undermined control because it 
disengaged employees. Even official MES champions did not always understand it, as 
the third author found out when seeking clarification on a tool she was tasked to work 
on. As she was told:  
 
“...there’s an element of common sense with regards to the tools. However, I’m still 
not completely clear on how some of them should work, so if, for example, someone 
asks me about…  [a MES tool], I would have to search for paperwork... This leads 
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to a constant worry ‘cos if I am challenged, I’m pretty much buggered.” [laughing] 
(Niall, Middle Manager) 
 
The precondition of universal involvement was to be achieved through a comprehensive 
training programme and the application of MES tools. The staff were required to 
complete 17 online training modules over a nine-month period.  The modules ranged 
from 30 minutes to three hours and electronic surveillance was used to monitor their 
completion. Although the training was monitored on a monthly and then weekly basis, 
our analysis revealed that only 37% of individuals completed the training by the 
deadline. Some staff, including four middle managers, completed less than 20% of the 
training while the Managing Director did not complete any of the modules. Since 
statistics were compiled to create staff rankings based on completed training, this 
bureaucratic control gradually contributed to what Sewell and Barker (2006) refer to as 
reverse surveillance as it exposed managers to scrutiny. The lack of management 
participation demoralised those tasked to encourage employee training: 
 
Louise: “I don’t get it! How can they make us do this training when they don’t hold 
themselves accountable?” 
 
Niall (middle manager): “I don’t know, it just isn’t fair, I don’t want to be in this 
position, I don’t want to be chasing everyone and I don’t really know what to say 
when it’s pointed out that certain managers couldn’t be bothered…..  I’m becoming 
a bit of a joke, I’m putting pressure on people every day, and they laugh when they 




Louise bemoaned the lack of management ‘accountability’. It created a contradiction 
for by failing to display an accountable self (du Gay and Salaman, 1992), Boltco’s 
managers hindered the normative controls they sought to promote. It illuminates that 
managers may be ‘responsible for lapses in the translation of effort into output’ 
(Burawoy,1979:10). The managers further contradicted the precondition of universal 
involvement by allowing some staff to evade control. This surfaced, for example, in an 
exchange during a team meeting when a member of staff criticised another for their 
lack of involvement:  
 
Trisha (middle manager): “Can you discuss this with Amy as she still hasn’t attended 
any [MES] meetings?”  
 
Nigel (senior manager): “This is not the forum for that, it’s easy to point the finger 
at individuals who aren’t taking [MES] seriously but it’s not appropriate at this 
level......”  
 
[after the meeting] 
 
Tanya (middle manager): “…what did you think about Trisha’s comments regarding 
Amy?” 
 
Kevin (middle manager): “Bloody disgraceful, Amy works really hard.” 
(Research Journal) 
Despite universal involvement being a precondition of MES, Amy opted out of team 
meetings and, as a ‘hard’ worker, was allowed to evade normative control (i.e. team 
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subjectivity). Rather than achieving normative consensus through teamwork, MES 
therefore inadvertently created divisions. 
Another precondition of MES was ‘engaged leadership’ but management diverged 
in its engagement and some resisted by failing to complete MES training. Other 
managers encouraged engagement in MES, whilst simultaneously ‘distancing’ 
(Collinson,1994) themselves from it.  Some evaded MES work and diverted attention 
from themselves by criticising others for a lack of engagement. It was not uncommon 
for MES to be raised only briefly at the end of meetings. At one such formal meeting 
of Boltco’s middle managers, a senior manager observed in a concluding speech:  
 
“We have to embrace [MES] and show an example to staff that we believe in this. 
Maybe I need to be involved in some more activities... We should all not be so 
cynical, we need to use more tools and get better feedback. We talk the language, 
we need to make sure we do the deal. [MES] makes a difference; we need to move 
this forward. [MES] so far, within our organisation, has been more luck than 
judgement. We don’t do a good job of selling the good stuff, and instead we make 
out it’s a chore... Look, we just need to make sure that everyone believes it’s the way 
forward … the coercive pressure didn’t help, if we had a chance to implement 
ourselves gradually...well, who knows!” (Nigel, Senior Manager) 
 
The allusion to MES being a ‘chore’ and to ‘cynicism’ implies that it was resisted at 
multiple levels. Raising MES at the end of the meeting suggests that it is not a priority. 
Additionally, Nigel’s comment that ‘maybe’ he needs to be more ‘involved’ reveals his 
distance from it. His criticisms of the PO’s coercion may unintentionally fuel opposition 
to MES. Reflecting these contradictions and managerial divisions, the third author 
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continued to perform her Marketing role without much change in her routine. Although 
as a manager, she felt obliged to implement MES while working in cross-functional 
teams, she was reluctant to impose MES processes on her peers as this ran counter to 
cultural norms at Boltsco.   
 
This section has discussed how senior and middle managers along with staff engaged 
in activities that undermined the preconditions of MES. The outcome was that MES 
was seen as ‘the work of the few and not of many’ despite ‘universal involvement’ and 
‘engaged leadership’ being its preconditions. The content of MES (jargon, bureaucracy, 
complexity) that was supposed to secure control had the unintended consequence of 
undermining its preconditions. We now turn to the ways in which MES ‘processes’ 
eroded control.  
 
(3). Undermining MES through its processes  
As a mechanism of control, MES required everyone to participate in continuous 
improvement through teamwork and inter-team co-operation. This process was 
undermined because teams focused on individual projects, and often failed to share the 
outputs of their work with other teams, which in turn made it more difficult for other 
teams to work on their tasks. Team members were also reluctant to engage in the work 
of other teams. This is evident in the following extract from a conversation between a 
team leader and team member.  The leader asked for help in tackling a problem that 
another team was facing: 
 




Trish clearly felt separate from the work of other teams and refused to embrace the 
normative discourse of teams beyond that of her own team. The work of MES was seen 
as an additional burden for which Trish did not have ‘time’. The lack of input from 
unreconstituted staff, who refused to embrace the normative discourse of teamwork, 
undermined how MES was supposed to work:  
 
Niall (middle manager): “It is becoming more difficult to keep the team engaged 
as there is little or no information to work with. I seem to be having meetings 
for the sake of meetings, which is becoming a joke.  We are trying to come up 
with reasons for working on improvements without the evidence to back it up. 
This is not how it is supposed to work.”  
 
This frustration was also experienced by the third author who, while working in the 
certification team, struggled to complete MES tasks as there was no input from other 
teams to work on. At times, this caused tensions among staff and between staff and the 
team leaders. Neither the PO nor senior managers looked at how tasks were 
accomplished as long as MES metrics were deemed satisfactory. Control stuttered and 
staggered and continually met with obstacles.  
One very unpopular MES tool was the 5S process, which required staff to ‘sort’ 
and ‘straighten’ their workspace to ‘create workplace efficiency’ and ‘improve morale’ 
(MES training manual). Daily 5S workspace inspections antagonised both the 5S 
inspectors and  the inspected. The third author, who briefly worked in the 5S team, 
described her experience of inspecting colleagues’ workspaces as ‘emotionally 
draining’ and ‘surreal’. The 5S performance rankings were regularly published and staff 
were ‘named and shamed’ for small transgressions such as keeping too many pens. 
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Rather than securing control, being ‘named and shamed’ gradually became socially 
acceptable. The implementation of this unpopular MES tool exacerbated tensions 
among staff as those who were tasked with carrying out the inspections, in particular 
the leader of the 5S team, became the target of deep resentment. It was not uncommon 
to hear references to the ‘5S Gestapo’. Such unpopular MES tools further undermined 
morale and MES’s effectiveness.  
A further challenge for the processes of MES was staff not attending team 
meetings. Every MES team meeting was observed to suffer from absences because they 
were seen as an interruption to the day’s work. Even staff who attended meetings 
frequently failed to participate. To urge involvement, MES champions used coercion 
thus intensifying the sense of negativity. The complex bureaucracy that arose through 
MES allowed staff to resist participating in its processes as the following example 
illustrates:   
 
Third author: “So have you done any online training yet?”  
 
Frank (middle manager): “No! Mark asked me about progress on this twice, the first 
time I told him I hadn’t done it, the second time I said I’ve never formally been asked 
to do it, I haven’t heard from him since” [laughing] 
 
Third Author: “So you haven’t started?” 
 
Frank (middle manager): “No, he never sent the paperwork, I’m still waiting for my 




The MES bureaucracy, lack of resources, overburdened employees and champions plus 
the disengaged Boltsco management undermined the processes through which control 
was to be achieved. Frank used the bureaucracy to avoid training, which can be seen as 
a form of ‘making out’ (Burawoy,1979; McCabe,2014; Roy,1955) to avoid what he 
saw as unnecessary work. Nevertheless, this resistance is not divorced from consent as 
he continued to plough on with his job (see also Collinson,1992;1994; McCabe,2014).  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has sought to advance our understanding of management control 
through drawing on proximal theorising. This encourages us not to see control as an 
‘end’ to the ‘elaborate plans’ of corporate executives, consultants or gurus but as a 
process. Rather than the ‘end’ of ‘everything that stands’, it is understood that everyday 
life continues with its complexity, twists, turns, contradictions and ambiguities 
irrespective of the form of control. Control is not ‘presumed or privileged in advance’ 
(Cooper and Law, 1995:240) because ‘safety’, in terms of the ability to resist corporate 
demands, remains, as do ‘surprises’, because the outcomes of control are not 
guaranteed. This means that we cannot ‘picture what will be’ from corporate intentions 
and so control emerges as an ongoing process that needs to be explored. If we assume 
the ends of control without investigating the processes through which is it pursued, not 
just in theory but in practice, there is a danger of slipping into ‘distal’ (Cooper and Law, 
1995) thinking that equates outcomes with the potential of strategies, technologies or 
cultures. This is like predicting the journey of a cart before it is hitched to the horse or 
‘putting its ends before its beginnings’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 237). Of course, control 
often has deleterious effects on employees. Nevertheless, to think about control as a 
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‘process’ rather than an ‘end’ can help to put such mechanisms into context whereby 
control is seen as always unfinished, contestable and indeterminate.   
To return to our earlier metaphor, distal theorising assumes that the fly can be 
caught due to the design/properties of the web. It underestimates the agency of the fly, 
flaws in the web’s construction, dew on the threads or leaves that pierce its strands. A 
distal approach to control is evident in our case study in the way that the PO and some 
Boltco managers proffered tools and assumed that MES could be achieved. A proximal 
understanding of control can also be seen in the aspiration of continuous improvement, 
which means that control ‘remains forever “unfinished”’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 267) 
because if control can be improved then it has not reached an ‘end’.  
A ‘proximal’ approach suggests ‘that everything could be otherwise’ (Cooper 
and Law, 1995: 264); it draws our attention to the actions, subjectivities, processes, 
unintended consequences and incompleteness of control.  In our case, the proximal is 
evident in the ubiquitous unintended consequences that arose in relation to MES. The 
controls generated and melded with unintended consequences and so control, in 
proximal terms, is in constant tension, adaptation and movement. It is not just that 
multiple forms of control meld together to produce something new (Orlikowski, 1991), 
or that each form of control ‘generates quite specific tensions’ (Clegg and Courpasson, 
2004: 545) but that control is elusive and has to be continually produced.  
It makes little sense then to ‘take it for granted that there are hierarchies or 
sequences given in the order of things’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 240) because how 
control plays out is unlikely to match the intended order or intentions (see Knights and 
McCabe,1998). While the distal ‘spider of control’ remains vigilant, proximal 
theorising elucidates its failures and continuous attempts to repair an imperfect web. In 
Ingold’s (2008) amusing account, the agency of the fly allowed it to escape the web but 
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it could equally have been a hole or tear in the web (i.e. jargon, tools, paperwork, 
drawing processes or communication charts) as the material world plays a part in both 
securing and thwarting control.  
To assume, in managerial terms, that the problem is one of design or 
implementation reflects ‘distal’ thinking such that next time MES will be pursued 
successfully in a less bureaucratic way by united managers and accountable leaders 
who skillfully communicate their intentions. Yet, promixal theorising suggests 
otherwise, for the web of control will slip from the branch, fluttering wings may catch 
it and the spider will begin again spinning its yarn. These insights, generated through 
proximal theorising, could help to explain why so many change initiatives fail along 
with the recent succession of management fads and fashions.  
To conclude, we are advocating a way of understanding control that avoids 
‘prediction’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 241) or anticipating outcomes based on a certain 
technology, strategy or intervention for to do so presents an ‘end’ that cannot be known 
in advance.  By contrast, control from a proximal position ‘always remains 
unfinished…never arrives, it’s always next’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 242) and so it is 
never an end. Of course, employees may be subject to intense and debilitating control 
but still the everyday operation of control is ongoing and needs to be explored. A 
proximal approach calls for ethnographic research to unpack the unfolding details, 
processes, relations, subjectivities, actions and unintended consequences that arise.  As 
Cooper and Law (1995) point out, the distal and the proximal exist in tension and 
‘depend on each other’ (Cooper and Law, 1995: 271). The proximal is a target for 
control through distal means whilst the proximal remains elusive. We hope that these 
insights will encourage others to excavate what control means on-the-ground rather 
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The MES philosophy Unintended Consequences 
(1) Assumptions 
Standardization to improve efficiency. 
Framed as universal, underpinning all 
activities.  
 
MES framed as:  
- a burden with little value added  
- separate from real-work 
- unsuitable for local needs  
(2) Preconditions 
Familiarity with a complex set of tools that 
are to produce performance improvements.  
Avoidance of training  
Limited engagement with MES 
tools. 
Familiarity with the extensive idiosyncratic 
vocabulary  
Limited take-up of MES vocabulary 
and its use for political purposes 
Universal involvement required Allowing exceptions to involvement   




Co-operation between teams and identifying 
problems through continuous improvement.  
Refusing to share knowledge with 
other teams  
Limited involvement 
 
Creating MES specific activities for all.  
 
Overburdening MES champions to 
evade responsibility 
Avoiding MES meetings 
Table I Characteristics of MES and its interrelated unintended consequences.  
 
